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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Before trial, a hearing was held on appellant's Motion
to Suppress. This motion was denied and the money found
in appellant's car was admitted into evidence during trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury found appellant guilty of grand larceny from
which appellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the verdict of the trial court
be affirmed.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondeat agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter set forth.
At the tiirn: of the z..uest of appellant and her <laugh.
ter, they were in an automobile with appellant's husband
(Tr. 137). The husband was not arrested at first but lawr
was arrested at a cafe in Parowan (Tr. 138). At that
time the car was locked and left on Main Street in front
of the Parowan Cafe. Because a tow truck was not available at the time, Officer Bradley drove the car to the
Parowan Police Department parking lot (Tr. 146). Afwr
impounding the car, an inventory of its contents was
made. Officer Bradley took the items out of the car, laid
them on top of the vehicle and called off the names of the
items (Tr. 147). Officer Bunting wrote down on a piece
of paper the names of the items impounded (TMP 12).
The practice in Iron County with regard to impounding
automobiles is to inventory all personal property inside
the vehicle for the protection of the officer and the owner
of the property (Tr. 147, TMP 41). The items inventoried
were listed in a descriptive manner so that they could be
identified (Tr. 148).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MONEY OBTAINED FROM THE AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH APPELLANT WAS RIDING WAS FOUND DURING AN INVEN-

3

TOLY MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
11\!POUNDJNG 07 THE AUTOMOBILE AND
\VAS THUS ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL.
Thi: CuurL has held tha~ unless clear error appears,
the trial couct's decision whether to admit evidence should
not be disturbed. State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444
P. 2d 517 (1968), holds:

"Due to the responsibility of the trial court in
controlling the admissibility of evidence, and his
advantaged position to pass on such matters, it is
his prerogative to make this determination. For
those reasons his ruling should be indulged with
a presumption of correctness, and should not be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was in
error." Id. at 519.
In the pre'.>ent case, prior to trial, a lengthy hearing was
held on the same issue which is the subject of this appeal.
After fil pages of testimony and argument, the lower
court denied appellant's Motion to Suppress and admitted
into evidence the money found in the automobile (Tr.
149). In accordance with Crisco/,a, supra, the determination of the trial judge to admit the money into evidence
"should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he
was in error." Id.
The admissibility of evidence obtained through police
procedures designed to protect the property of incarcerated defendants was clearly established as an exception
to the warrant requirement in Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234 (1968). In Harris the defendant moved to
suppress an automobile registration card belonging to the
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robbery •:ictim v:n:ch was found in defendant's car pursuant to a police department regulation requiring the officer who impounded a vehicle to search it thoroughly, to
l·~move all valuables from it, and to attach an information
tag to it. The court held the card to be admissible because
its discovery "was not the result of a search of the car,
but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in
riolice custody_ Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these narrow circumstances." Id_ at 236.
In following the Harris decision, this Court in Criscola, supra, held admissible the evidence obtained through
a police officer's inventory of the contents of a defendant's
automobile at the time of its impounding, a procedure
designed for the protection of the car owner as well as for
the police. The court held:
"When the officers thus became responsible for
the car and its contents, it was in conformity with
ordinary prudence and customary practice, for the
protection of the car owner as well as the police, for
the officers to take an inventory of its contents.
This of course necessarily involves discovery of
what the contents were. To suggest that under
those circumstances where the police had thus
come into the possession of personal property
which they had reason to believe was connected
with a felony, they would have to go and obtain a
warrant to conduct a search and find that which
they already had lawful possession of, seems completely discordant with reason." 444 P. 2d at 519.
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In the opinion of the court, not only were the officers acting within their rights, but they would mve been "remiss
in t~1cir duty" if they had not taken the evidence and
usul it in bu~lding a case against the defendant.
Other state courts have upheld the use of evidence
obtained by police when they make an inventory of impounded automobiles. In People v. Marchese, 80 Cal.
Tiptr. 525 (Cal. App. 1969), the court held that "where
an officer is engaged in the making of a good faith inventory preparatory to or in the immediate process of impounding a car the activity is constitutional." Id. at 527.
See also State v. Potts, 464 P. 2d 742 (Wash. App. 1969).
Applying the facts of the present case to the law established by the United States Supreme Court and this
Court, the money found during the inventory was properly admitted, as evidenced in the trial court. When appellant and the other occupants of the automobile were
arrested and the automobile impounded, the police officers
became responsible for the automobile and its contents.
To protect the property owners and the officers, the contents of the automobile were inventoried (TMP 41). This
procedure was not decided upon as a hasty excuse to
search the automobile but was a customary and well-justified procedure (Tr. 147). The inventory was conducted
in a reasonable and routine manner. One officer took the
items out of the car, laid them on top and called out their
names (Tr. 147), while another officer made a list of the
items (TMP 12). The items inventoried were listed in
an ordinarily descriptive manner (Tr. 148). Certainly

6

officers should not be required dming an inventory t.o
close their eyes to evidence of the crime for which a p~r
son is arrested; nor should officers be penalized for protecting themselves and the property of persons in custody.
Since there was no evidence that the inventory was conducted in an unreasonable or unlawful manner, the money
found during the inventory was properly admitted as evidence in the trial court.

CONCLUSION
The admission of evidence during the inventory of
an impounded vehicle has been upheld by the high coum
of this nation and state. Since the evidence does not show
that the lower court was clearly in error in admitting the
money found in the automobile into evidence, its decision
should be affirmed.
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